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The social factors that influence cooperation have remained largely uninvestigated but
have the potential to explain much of the variation in cooperative behavior observed
in the natural world. We show here that certain dimensions of the social environment,
namely the size of the social group, the degree of social tolerance expressed, the structure
of the dominance hierarchy, and the patterns of dispersal, may influence the emergence
and stability of cooperation in predictable ways. Furthermore, the social environment
experienced by a species over evolutionary time will have shaped their cognition to pro-
vide certain strengths and strategies that are beneficial in their species’ social world.
These cognitive adaptations will in turn impact the likelihood of cooperating in a given
social environment. Experiments with one primate species, the cottontop tamarin, illus-
trate how social dynamics may influence emergence and stability of cooperative behavior
in this species. We then take a more general viewpoint and argue that the hypotheses
presented here require further experimental work and the addition of quantitative model-
ing to obtain a better understanding of how social dynamics influence the emergence and
stability of cooperative behavior in complex systems. We conclude by pointing out sub-
sequent specific directions for models and experiments that will allow relevant advances
in the understanding of the emergence of cooperation.
Keywords: Social behavior; nonhuman primates; cooperation; cottontop tamarins;
Saguinus oedipus; complex systems.
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1. Introduction
Examples of cooperation are scattered throughout the Animal Kingdom. Bottlenose
dolphins (Tursiops sp) form alliances of two to three males to capture and maintain
access to females for periods lasting from hours to weeks, and alliance membership
can be stable for up to 20 years [14]. In the Red Sea, groupers (Plectropomus
pessuliferus) and giant moray eels (Gymnothorax javanicus) combine specialized
hunting skills to create an interspecific team that can capture prey better together
than either could alone [9]. Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) in some wild populations
cooperatively hunt monkeys and work in stealthily coordinated teams to patrol the
boundaries of their territory and investigate neighboring communities [5, 42]. Com-
plex systems, such as insect or human societies, have arisen and continue evolving
because of cooperative behavior; in fact, from hunter-gatherer societies to nation-
states, cooperation is the decisive organizing principleof human society [44]. Coop-
eration in all its forms has generated a great deal of observational, experimental
and theoretical work, but the pattern of its occurrence remains far from understood
in the natural world.
Cooperation is defined here as two or more individuals working together to
achieve a common goal [21]. From an evolutionary perspective, cooperation of this
sort does not pose a dilemma when individuals obtain more benefits by team-
ing up with others than they would obtain by working alone, as long as there is
some mechanism in place to resist invasion by individuals who reap the benefits
of others’ cooperative efforts (“cheaters”) [4, 48]. Several such mechanisms have
been identified in the literature, ranging from kin selection through reciprocity to
assortativity or network reciprocity [45]. Benefits of cooperation may come in the
immediate form of calories from prey, decreased predation risk, or increased access
to potential mates, for example, but are assumed to translate into an increase in
individual fitness, defined by the number of offspring that survive to reproductive
age, measured relative to others [48].
In the above context, this paper adds to the current literature on cooperation
and particularly on its emergence and sustainability in complex systems because it
touches upon an issue which has been overlooked both in experiments and models.
Indeed, understanding why individuals cooperate from an evolutionary perspective,
to increase fitness, does not inform us of how individuals manage to achieve coop-
eration in their social environments. Amidst a great deal of research on cooperative
interactions, there has been little attempt to explain when cooperation emerges
in social groups and when its expression is constrained. Cooperation necessarily
involves multiple individuals and is thus social in nature, yet somewhat ironically
we understand very little about the social conditions that influence the emergence
and stability of cooperative behavior. Therefore, an understanding of the social
circumstances that promote cooperation is needed. Although there are impressive
examples of cooperation throughout the animal world, the taxonomic order Pri-
mates shows a great deal of variation in social dynamics [38] and the cooperation
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of many primate species has been extensively studied [reviewed in 57]. By initially
focusing on this well-studied taxa, an examination of how the social environment
facilitates or constrains cooperative expression is possible. We will thus learn sev-
eral lessons that should inform subsequent experimental or theoretical work on
cooperation in complex systems.
To this end, the paper is organized as follows: in Sec. 2, we present the main
features characterizing social dynamics of primates in order to allow us to discuss
in depth their relevance as to how cooperation may be established and stabilized.
This discussion is carried out at a theoretical and abstract level in Sec. 3, whereas
subsequently Sec. 4 presents the available evidence of the effect of social factors on
cooperative behavior for the case study of one primate species in which cooperative
behavior has been extensively studied, the cottontop tamarin (Saguinus oedipus).
Finally, Sec. 5 puts together the ideas of Sec. 3 with the results of Sec. 4 and dis-
cusses how this emerging body of knowledge of social behavior should inform further
modeling and experimentation of cooperative interactions, particularly of human
behavior in complex environments. The paper is closed with a brief, summarizing
conclusion section.
2. Primate Social Dynamics
Hinde [33] proposed a conceptual, descriptive framework for examining social struc-
ture involving three principal levels: level one consists of isolated interactions
between individuals, level two is created by the relationships between individuals
and described by the content, quality and temporal patterns of their interactions,
and level three generates the social structure described by the content, quality and
patterning of the level two relationships. The social grouping patterns of the living
primates are diverse and can be coarsely categorized as asocial (solitary), family
groups, harems consisting of one-male multi-female groups (sometimes co-occurring
with groups of “bachelor” males whose social group lacks a female), and multi-male,
multi-female groups [56, 64].
The socioecological model has provided the most influential explanation for why
primate species vary in their social structures, proposing that variation in social
structures results from variation in ecological pressures. Simply put, the distribution
and abundance of food influences the number of females in a group as well as the
competitive or cooperative nature of female relationships, and the quantity and
spatial distribution of females will in turn influence the number of males [63, 74].
The socioecological model remains influential and explains much of the observed
diversity in the Primate Order [but see Ref. 65].
The resultant social structure can be described on multiple dimensions that
vary across species. Many of these dimensions provide information about the char-
acteristics of the social interactions of individuals in that society that we argue
can be used to predict when cooperation should be likely. These dimensions are
not independent of one another and include group size, the amount of social
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tolerance expressed, the structure of the dominance hierarchy, and the patterns of
dispersal.
• Group size is the number of individuals that associate with each other more than
they associate with individuals who belong to another group. Primate group sizes
range between 1 and 115 individuals [37].
• Social tolerance is a concept that captures the probability that individuals will
be in proximity to conspecifics around valuable resources with little or no aggres-
sion [55, 71]. A species with small inter-individual distances when foraging and
low rates of aggression would be characterized as high in social tolerance; a species
with low social tolerance would typically show large inter-individual distances
when foraging and an increase in the frequency of aggressive interactions when
constrained to forage in close proximity to others.
• The structure of the dominance hierarchy is characterized in two complementary
ways, by its linearity and steepness. The linearity of a dominance hierarchy pro-
vides information about the degree of transitivity between individuals of different
ranks whereas the steepness indicates the degree to which individuals differ from
each other in winning aggressive encounters or access to resources [68].
• The dispersal pattern of a species indicates which sex typically emigrates at
puberty. This is a characteristic that is rather stable within a species, and func-
tions to minimize inbreeding risk. In some species the males disperse, in other
species the females disperse, and in a few species neither sex typically disperses.
3. How Can the Social Environment Influence Cooperation?
Collectively, the dimensions above characterize a large part of the primate social
environment. The expression of cooperative behavior likely depends on an interac-
tion between the immediate social environment as well as the evolved psychological
predispositions of individuals. Contrary to what is usually done in the literature,
namely focusing on the latter and trying to understand how evolution can explain
why individuals cooperate, we are going to examine what might be the possible
influences of social factors on cooperation. Although cooperation can occur between
dyads as well as trios and larger parties, the discussion below will refer to dyads for
the sake of simplicity. All arguments apply equally well to cooperative units larger
than the dyad.
3.1. The immediate social environment
The immediate, or current, social environment should affect the opportunity for
and stability of cooperative behavior in directions that may be predicted by the
dimensions above, beginning with group size. The group size of a species will deter-
mine the maximum number of potential cooperative partners that are available, all
other social factors withstanding. In larger groups there will be more partner choice,
which can positively influence the emergence and stability of cooperation [45]. Thus,
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primates living in larger social groups may be more likely to exhibit cooperative
behavior than those in smaller groups. However, the number of potential partners
will then be reduced by the limitations imposed by the social dynamics of the group.
The degree of social tolerance should constrain the number of cooperative part-
nerships that can be realized out of all possible partnerships given the group size.
In cases where individuals have the opportunity to cooperate to obtain valuable
resources such as food or mates, the degree of social tolerance expressed by the
social group will influence the ability of individuals to maintain the necessary prox-
imity to one another in the presence of this resource [67]. If a group is highly tolerant
and most individuals are able to be in close proximity to most other individuals
around resources, then the number of potential partnerships should not be much
reduced from all possible combinations given the group size. However, if the group
has low social tolerance and only select individuals can gather together without
risk of aggression around valuable resources, the potential for the emergence of
cooperative behavior should be minimized.
Should members of the group maintain sufficient proximity for the cooperation
(which may vary depending on the cooperative challenge), social tolerance may
impact an individual’s ability to cooperate with others who are present in an addi-
tional way. In a group with high social tolerance, individuals should experience a
social atmosphere with less risk of aggression around resources that would presum-
ably allow individuals to better attend to and perform the cooperative task. In
this scenario of reduced social stress, presumably an individual has greater cogni-
tive resources to allocate to the cooperative challenge, which could lead to more
instances of successful cooperative problem solving [similar arguments have been
made in regards to social tolerance and social learning, see Refs. 15 and 57].
The linearity of the dominance hierarchy provides an indication of the amount
of transitivity between individuals of different dominance ranks. In a society with a
nonlinear dominance hierarchy, the group is more egalitarian and it will be less pre-
dictable ahead of time which individuals will obtain benefits. Amongst individuals
in a nonlinear dominance hierarchy there would exist a greater number of potential
cooperative partners with whom the opportunity to obtain (or retain) the benefits
of cooperation is nearly equal, compared to more linear hierarchies. Given that
individuals should be more likely to engage in cooperation if they obtain enough
benefits from cooperating to outweigh the costs invested, one might expect more
potential cooperative dyads in groups with nonlinear dominance hierarchies. How-
ever, it may also be possible that lack of linearity in a dominance hierarchy produces
uncertainty amongst potential cooperators about the allocation of rewards that may
lead to social stress in a low tolerance society and, as described above, minimize
cooperative performance. Thus the influence of dominance linearity may interact
with social tolerance such that nonlinearity only increases cooperative opportunities
in a group if the group is high in social tolerance.
The steepness of the dominance hierarchy by definition reflects the magnitude
of the differences obtained between individuals of different ranks. Therefore a steep
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hierarchy would correspond with a society in which a larger proportion of the possi-
ble cooperative dyads would produce benefits than would be distributed unequally
between individuals. Even if the benefits obtained by an individual outweigh the
costs that individual invested in the cooperative act, some would argue that wit-
nessing another individual obtain more rewards than oneself for the same amount of
effort is frustrating [52] or aversive [e.g. 73] and may therefore lead to a decrease in
future cooperation. Thus, a society in which the dominance hierarchy is steep may
consist of fewer dyads likely to repeatedly engage in cooperation, and the stability
of cooperation would be compromised.
These posited influences of dominance steepness and linearity rest on the
assumption that primates do not share the spoils of their labor based on the amount
of effort invested. To date, evidence of sharing based on investment in naturally
occurring nonhuman primate cooperation comes from one population of wild chim-
panzees located in Ta¨ı National Park, Coˆte d’Ivoire [4]. If effort-based resource
distribution occurs in other primate populations, these groups may be released
from the constraining effects of dominance structure proposed here. However, to
date the evidence for sharing spoils based on labor is limited and there are other
factors that explain resource distribution after successful chimpanzee hunts [43].
Finally, the dispersal patterns may influence patterns of cooperation within the
group because the nondispersing sex has more opportunity to form long-term rela-
tionships with others of the same sex in their group. When individuals are engaged
in long-term relationships, the probability of repeated interactions is high, and the
opportunity to reciprocate or make up for losses incurred in previous interactions
is greater than between individuals in engaged in short-term relationships [66].
Avoiding a net loss in repeated interactions with a long-term partner need not be
cognitively demanding nor involve any calculated score keeping, as symmetrical,
long-term relationships may result in a balance of benefits over a series of repeated
interactions [e.g. 19, 71].
Therefore, the immediate social environment should influence the opportunity
for cooperative interactions in predictable directions, as well as the distribution
of benefits that results from the cooperative effort. This distribution of benefits
may then feedback into an individual’s likelihood of engaging in cooperation again
at the proximate level, e.g. by reinforcing cooperative behavior of individuals, and
therefore influence the stability of cooperation, should it emerge. Although the dis-
cussion has thus far focused on the emergence and stability of cooperation within
one’s lifetime, the distribution of benefits may influence the evolution of cooper-
ative systems as well if the benefits gained by cooperative individuals are indeed
translating into increased reproductive success [48].
3.2. The psychology of potential cooperators
The immediate social environment will influence the opportunities for cooperative
interactions and the distribution of benefits that result from cooperation, but the
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psychology of the species will influence how these opportunities are interpreted and
acted upon. The psychological predispositions that characterize each species are
subject to natural selection just as physical traits are, given that there is variation
in the population and differential reproduction associated with this variation. The
fitness of primates depends upon navigating a complex social world of potential
enemies, allies and mates, a milieu that varies from one species to the next; therefore
species are likely to be equipped with psychological strengths and strategies that
have proven advantageous in the social domain of their evolutionary past [2, 10].
Depending on the exact constellation of the social dimensions described above, the
specific psychological predispositions that would have provided a fitness advantage
and have been selected would vary across species, which may in turn differentially
impact the propensity of the species to exploit opportunities to cooperate with
conspecifics.
For example, in some species the ability to monitor the behavior of others and
coordinate one’s own behavior accordingly is central to the survival of their own
offspring and their close relatives. This is the case in cooperative breeders whose
behavior is described in more detail below. Therefore, one hypothesis is that coop-
erative breeders have undergone natural selection to be psychologically predisposed
to monitor the behavior of others and coordinate their behavior flexibly with them
[e.g. 16]. Cooperative breeders presented with the opportunity to cooperate outside
the offspring-rearing context may be poised to reach a cooperative solution because
they have a psychological bias to attend to the partners’ behavior and are skilled
at coordinating with others. Experiments aimed at testing the cooperative behav-
ior of a cooperatively breeding species outside of the offspring-rearing context are
discussed in more detail below.
Determining how exactly the psychology of a species has been shaped over time
by their past social environment is empirically challenging, perhaps even impossible,
but it is certain that the psychology of a species will have been subject to natural
selection in ways that differ across species [10]. What is proposed here is that evolved
psychological differences will influence the emergence of cooperation across species
in concert with the characteristics of the immediate, current social environment.
4. Case Study: Cooperative Breeders and Cooperative
Problem Solving
To investigate the role of social environment and evolved psychology on the emer-
gence and stability of cooperative behavior, a we turn to a selection of experiments
conducted with a captive colony of cottontop tamarins (Saguinus oedipus), cooper-
atively breeding monkeys endemic to Colombia. The social behavior and cognition
of cottontop tamarins has been studied in detail for nearly 30 years [reviewed in
59, 62]. Below is an overview of the social environment of cottontop tamarins and
a description of some experiments that begin to elucidate the role that social envi-
ronment and evolved psychology play in the emergence of cooperative behavior in
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nonhuman primates. The lesson we will learn from those experiments will be used
to pose specific questions about humans in the closing section.
4.1. Social environment of cooperative breeding primates
In cooperatively breeding systems, offspring care is provided not only by the bio-
logical parents, but also by “helpers” or “alloparents” who delay or forgo their
own reproduction entirely while rearing the offspring of the breeding pair. This
breeding system has evolved independently in multiple taxa, and is seen in about
120 mammalian species and 150 avian species [50]. In primates, only one taxonomic
Family, the Callithrichidae, which consists of more than 30 species of marmosets and
tamarins, exhibits cooperative breeding. In callithrichids, a social group is typically
comprised of one socially monogamous breeding pair and their adult and juvenile
offspring who gain inclusive fitness benefits by helping rear younger siblings [26,
59]. In cottontop tamarins specifically, the interbirth interval for the breeding pair
is six months, and dams give birth to twins that can weigh up to 20% of the moth-
ers’ body weight collectively. The twins require continuous carrying for the first
month of life and continue to be carried for up to 12 weeks [75]. Furthermore, the
biological mother is often pregnant with the next litter and nursing the previous
litter simultaneously. Thus, the energetic burden of offspring is extremely high, and
in fact the number of helpers present is predictive of infant survival [58, 62].
Callithrichid life involves constant monitoring and coordination with group
mates in order to coordinate the cooperative rearing of young. Group sizes in the
wild are typically between six to nine individuals [62]. Although some unrelated
individuals might join groups as helpers [53], the average relatedness among group
mates is presumably high and neither sex regularly disperses. Mature offspring,
mothers and fathers coordinate behavior for infant care, travel, food sharing and
predator detection [11, 62]. Because the twin offspring must be constantly carried
by one or two group members, transfers between carriers require monitoring of the
behavior of the infant and the other helpers, and flexible spatial and temporal coor-
dination between helpers. Like other callithrichids, cottontop tamarins are strongly
dependent on group mates for survival and reproductive success. Their relationships
have been described as valuable and secure, with frequent affiliation and infrequent
aggression [1, 54].
4.2. Cooperation experiments
In order to investigate the cooperative behavior of tamarins outside the offspring-
rearing context, tamarins were presented with a cooperative task that required
high social tolerance and behavioral coordination between partners. The apparatus
(Fig. 1) was designed such that tamarins needed to simultaneously pull two han-
dlesin order to release food rewards, but the handles were located too far apart for
one tamarin to reach both. The requirement of simultaneous pulling was enforced
by elastic bands attached to each handle; only when tension was applied to both
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Fig. 1. The cooperation apparatus. The top panel depicts the apparatus when it is unsolved.
Grey ovals represent food rewards. When the trays (white horizontal bars) are simultaneously
extended from either side as shown by the horizontal arrows in the bottom panel, the holes in
the trays (black spaces) align and the food rewards fall through. Small openings near the bottom
of the apparatus (not shown) allow the tamarins to reach through and retrieve the food reward.
Elastic bands cause the trays to retract once tension is released and therefore ensure that two
tamarins must work together to solve the task.
handles simultaneously could the trays inside the apparatus align in such a way that
the food could fall through to the actors. Prior to testing, subjects were trained
on an apparatus that was lacking one tension band, so it was possible for a single
subject to solve the task by pulling one side first, and then the other. All subjects
reliably solved the task in this configuration, and their behavior indicated that they
correctly predicted the rewards to fall directly below their placement on the tray.
Tamarins were never trained to coordinate their actions; simultaneous pulling was
not required for success until the testing began [for details of training see 16]. The
apparatus was transparent and the rewards (small pieces of food) were visible from
the outset. In order to be successful the cooperators needed to be in close prox-
imity around this desirable resource, monitor the behavior of their partner, and
coordinate behavior accordingly.
In a series of controlled experiments, Cronin and colleagues utilized this appa-
ratus to investigate cooperative problem solving in a captive colony of cottontop
tamarins maintained at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. All experiments were
conducted with monogamous pairs of tamarins who did not currently have offspring
present. All subjects were unrelated to their partners, and had lived together with
their mate for at least five years. Behavioral data indicated that they shared a
long-term, stable bond with their unrelated partner [61].
In the first experiment [16], we investigated whether cottontop tamarins could
demonstrate basic behavioral cooperation, that is, we measured whether tamarins
could coordinate action in time and space to meet a common goal [5, 21]. Although
partners had to come into proximity around the valuable food rewards, the social
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tolerance required was relatively low because the rewards were visibly pre-divided
in space; prior to solving the task it was evident that a single reward on each side
of the apparatus was poised to fall into the reach of each actor (Fig. 1). We found
that all tamarin pairs tested were able to solve this task. Furthermore, behavioral
data suggests that they understood the role of the partner in the task and were
not just successful by chance cooccurrence of individual behaviors [67]. Tamarins
pulled less often during control conditions when their partner was not available to
help, and developed a technique of sustained pulling in which one tamarin would
extend the handle and wait for their partner to pull before releasing [16].
Comparing the performance of tamarins directly to other species should be
done with caution considering the use of different apparatuses and methods across
studies, however the performance measures available (latency to solve the task,
efficiency) [16] suggested that tamarins attained this cooperative solution as well
or better than all nonhuman primate species that have been studied in similar
cooperative paradigms [e.g. 7, 8, 12, 13, 28, 40, 41].
The cooperative success of the tamarins in the first experiment may have been
due in part to the clear and equal division of rewards. We questioned how the
cooperative performance of the dyads would change if individuals were not equally
rewarded for their actions, and presented the same dyads with a scenario in which
only one individual could benefit on each trial (Fig. 2) [19]. During the first exper-
iment, each pair of tamarins had developed a strategy in which one individual
regularly occupied the left side of the apparatus and one regularly occupied the
right. Therefore, in the second experiment, we simply baited the left side of the
apparatus on all trials on one day, and then on the next day we baited the right
side on all trials. We continued to alternate the baited side in this manner for ten
days. To release the single reward, both individuals again needed to work simulta-
neously, however, only one individual would be rewarded on each trial and it was
apparent prior to solving the task which individual would obtain the reward.
Tamarins continued to solve the majority of trials presented under this new
reward scenario, although the percentage of trials solved in this unequal reward
experiment was less than in the equal reward experiment [19]. Therefore, when
Fig. 2. The reward trajectory for the alternated reward scenario (experiment 2). The side of
the apparatus that was baited was alternated across days; here the right side of the apparatus
was baited and the figure depicts the trajectory of the reward after both handles have been
simultaneously extended. Only the tamarin on the right would be able to access this reward.
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transitioning from a cooperative situation in which both partners were rewarded
equally to a situation in which only one was rewarded, the tamarins did respond to
the decrease in their individual gain and solve fewer trials. Although this decrease
was significant, cooperation still occurred on more than 75% of trials. (A trial
was considered unsuccessful if the task was not solved within three minutes of
baiting. In the case of failure, the 10-trial session was ended and the tamarins were
scored as failing the remainder of the trials in that session; thus percent success
was conservatively calculated). Therefore, tamarins predominantly maintained their
cooperative behavior even when they did not receive any tangible benefits for their
efforts that day. They were willing to maintain a high level of cooperation when
only their pairbonded mate was rewarded [for detailed data on pair performance
across sessions, see Ref. 19], for limitations of provisioning behavior of tamarins,
see Refs. 17 and 18].
Cronin and colleagues hypothesized that the tamarins’ cooperative performance
under this alternated reward scenario was in part enabled by the long-term rela-
tionship between cooperators. Their tolerance of the temporarily inequitable reward
distribution may have been influenced by the fact that their partner was someone
with whom they shared a long-term, stable bond. As has been proposed by de
Waal & Luttrell [71] and discussed above, when individuals are engaged in long-
term, egalitarian relationships, temporary imbalances in costs and benefits between
actors are not so disruptive to behavior. Effects of varying relationships on cooper-
ative success and inequity tolerance have been evaluated in other species providing
preliminary support for this interpretation [3, 7, 40, 72]; however to test this hypoth-
esis the performance of newly established tamarin pairs would have to be compared
with the performance of the long-term partners in this study. Nonetheless, it seems
that the simplest explanation of the tamarins’ continued cooperation under this
alternated reward scenario is that they do not “keep score” with each other, and
cooperative behavior is able to persist in this social environment characterized by
long-term, egalitarian relationships.
The previous experiment demonstrated that cooperatively breeding tamarins
maintain cooperation when only one individual benefits, but what was removed
from the cooperative equation was the uncertainty about which actor would obtain
the benefits. As de Waal [69] pointed out, in addition to dominance, social toler-
ance is another determinant of resource acquisition, but the resources from this
cooperative opportunity were pre-assigned to actors. Therefore, in a third variant
of the cooperation task, we modified the apparatus such that a single reward was
delivered equidistant from both subjects upon completion of the cooperative act,
and the identity of the rewarded animal could not be known before the tamarins
engaged in cooperation (Fig. 3). This design has resulted in the breakdown of coop-
eration by some other primate species [e.g. 27, 70] and by dyads characterized by
low (but not high) social tolerance [40].
The results of the centered reward experiment indicated that the introduction
of this uncertainty did not influence the tamarins’ cooperative performance relative
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Fig. 3. The reward trajectory for the centered reward scenario (experiment 3). The trays were
different than the previous experiments; each tray had a single hole and the reward was initially
positioned equidistant from both subjects atop the trays in the clear cylinder. The figure depicts
the trajectory of the reward after both handles have been simultaneously extended. Both tamarins
were able to reach this reward.
to when the single reward was pre-assigned; tamarins solved nearly the same per-
centage of trials as the previous experiment (76% versus 78%). Although we did
not build into the design of the experiment a mechanism by which actors would be
equally rewarded, a near equal reward distribution resulted between partners [19].
How this reward distribution resulted is important for understanding how the
social environment of this species enables stable cooperation. Upon solving the task,
the single reward was released between the two cooperators. On nearly every trial,
both tamarins would reach quickly for the reward, and one would emerge with it.
When both reached for the reward, which they nearly always did, we observed an
equal chance that either would obtain it. In other words, there were not individuals
who were more or less skilled at retrieving the reward. Once a tamarin successfully
retrieved a reward, the individual in possession of the reward never actively trans-
ferred food to their partner. Therefore, the equality observed did not result from
some purposeful enactment of fairness by the tamarins, but the high social toler-
ance that enabled both individuals to reach for the reward without risk. In species
with lower tolerance or a steeper hierarchy, two individuals would not be equally
able to attempt to obtain the reward due to the risk of aggression associated with
snatching food in this manner.
Aggression following reward retrieval by one cooperator was virtually absent. In
this experiment, following 234 trials on which a reward was released (or 351 min of
observation) there were only five instances of behaviors that could be interpreted as
indicative of aggression, equating to a rate of only one potentially aggressive incident
every 39 trials. This was not higher than the rate of aggression observed in the
previous experiment where the rewarded individual was known prior to cooperation.
Given that there was no apparent aversion to temporary inequity (tamarins did
not stop engaging in the task following a trial in which their partner obtained the
reward) and that there was no risk to trying to obtain the reward, cooperation
remained stable among tamarin dyads.
The cooperation experiments conducted with cottontop tamarins begin to elu-
cidate the role that social factors may play in the emergence and stability of coop-
erative behavior, and suggest that in a highly tolerant society in which aggression
12
is rare and access to food is not regulated by a steep or linear hierarchy, cooper-
ation readily emerges between individuals engaged in long-term relationships and
their cooperation is stable to fluctuations in payoff. Furthermore, the tamarins’
performance on the cooperative task may have been facilitated by psychologi-
cal adaptations to cooperative breeding, such as attention to the social behavior
of group-mates and ability to coordinate behaviors with others. However, with-
out more examination of variation across potential dyads and careful comparisons
across species with different evolutionary histories and current social dynamics,
the contribution of each factor to the cooperative behavior of tamarins cannot be
teased apart.
5. Application to Experiments and Modeling
We have proposed that the social dynamics of nonhuman primates impact the
emergence and the stability or resilience of cooperative behavior. The cooperative
behaviors we have discussed involve two or more individuals working together to
acquire some resource. We have argued that the opportunity to cooperate and the
distribution of the resource obtained will be impacted by social factors such as the
size of the group, the amount of tolerance expressed in the group, the structure of
the dominance hierarchy, and the presence of long-term relationships. The preceding
section has shown examples of these influences in the case of cottontop tamarins.
We are thus in a position to ask: Do these considerations apply to humans? What
experiments could address this issue? What are the mechanisms arising that should
be incorporated in models of human social behavior?
It is important to realize that the questions we are raising here have an impact
at two different levels. First, the relation between sociality and cooperation must be
a key to understanding how early human societies developed from small groups of
hunter-gatherers. Second, given the highly socialized environments in which human
interaction takes place today, the effect of the factors we are discussing here must
permeate most of the endeavors carried out by groups, corporations, or, in fact,
any hierarchical organization.
5.1. Experiments
Empirical work has demonstrated that components of human cooperation assessed
through economic games such as the Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, Third Party
Punishment Game, Prisoner’s Dilemma and Public Goods Games differ in pre-
dictable ways across cultures [30–32] and within cultures [39]. Some of this variation
is predicted by community size [e.g. 32, 39] and kinship patterns of dispersal [39];
factors hypothesized to be influential in nonhuman primate cooperative expression
as well. These recent works are certainly an indication of the relevance of social
factors in human cooperation and point to the need for specifically designed exper-
iments test the ideas proposed above.
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Indeed, the relationship between social dynamics and cooperation posited above
for nonhuman primates makes predictions specifically in the context of coordina-
tion games that generate rewards whose distribution among the participants is not
preassigned. One direct way to investigate whether human societies differ in similar
contexts would be through experiments such as a Stag Hunt Game, in which the
subjects should try to coordinate in the payoff-dominant equilibrium, followed by
an Ultimatum Game, in which they have to decide how to share the total out-
come. Such a setup is comparable to the experiments described in Sec. 4 and would
allow us to find out whether human behaviors differ in ways that can be predicted
by the influences suggested to be important to nonhuman primates. This type of
assessment would help to determine whether our species is constrained by similar
dynamics as other primates, and also shed some light on potential universal con-
straints to cooperation in a scenario that commonly occurs in the real world. Of the
important aspects of social dynamics discussed above, the linearity and steepness
of the dominance hierarchy and the degree of social tolerance have not been opera-
tionalized (often) for human societies. One could imagine these traits to be assessed
more readily in corporations than cultures, an environment that could provide an
informative testbed for the hypothesis that performance on a coordination game
without predivided benefits would be predicted by these social dynamics important
to nonhuman primates.
In the case of nonhuman primates, the division of rewards may be predicted
by the actors to some degree by the dominance hierarchy and group-typical social
tolerance. Unlike many economic games, the payoff structure to each actor is not
known ahead of time [but see 20, 36], but the total pot to be obtained by the success-
ful cooperative team may be. Experiments with humans that integrate uncertainty
the distribution and quantity of benefits would provide much-needed information
about whether reward uncertainty interacts with social dynamics in humans in the
same way that it appears to in nonhuman primates, namely with reward uncer-
tainty making cooperation unstable in societies with steep, linear hierarchies and
low social tolerance.
In this discussion, a key point is that exploring sociality means relaxing the
anonymity condition proper to most economic experiments. In fact, much of the
influence of social dynamics on cooperative behavior in nonhuman primates relies on
an awareness of the identity of one’s cooperative partner(s). Clearly there are valu-
able reasons for maintaining anonymous relations amongst participants in experi-
mental assessments of cooperative decision making, but it would be of interest to
learn how revealing partner identities (specifically knowledge of a higher or lower
ranking partner) would influence strategy choice in the coordination for nondi-
vided rewards scenario described above. Perhaps this could be accomplished uni-
directionally, by allowing one subject an option to learn of their partner’s identity
in secret but not vice-versa, minimizing the potential influences of reputation and
reciprocity. In this respect, an interesting alternative to experiments within cor-
porations is to stick to volunteer subjects, and assign them a ranking either by
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solving some test, by competing in some game, or even at random, and then pro-
ceed with the specific economic experiment (which could be as above a combination
of a coordination game and a bargaining game, or other social dilemmas).
5.2. Modeling issues
The assessment of the role of social dynamics on primate (human and nonhuman)
cooperation allows the suggestion of features that should be considered in mod-
els or simulations order to better reflect information that may be important to
understanding the emergence and resilience of cooperation. Before entering into
the specific issues, it is clear from this discussion that in a social context individu-
als do not interact randomly, nor do they interact with every other one. Therefore,
modeling approaches based on well-mixed populations or mean-field approaches
will not be able to capture the social influences addressed here. Yet it is clear
that any reasonable model will need to include an interaction network, and pos-
sibly and imitation network that is not necessarily the same [22, 47]. A word of
caution is in order here, as very recent results predict [24] that networks do not
affect the outcome of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game played by humans, but they
can still have an influence on the behavior found in other games, as several the-
ories predict [51]. On the other hand, links between nodes (individuals) are far
from homogenous in primate societies (humans included). Primates are embed-
ded in a social network that represents the probability of interaction with another
node. It is becoming increasingly common to utilize association matrices to define
social networks, but one lesson to be learned from this discussion of nonhuman
primate behavior is that the data utilized to create the network should be rele-
vant to the cooperative context. An association matrix defined by proximity in a
context where valuable resources are absent may be very different from one when
they are present, yet the latter situation is the context that presents cooperative
opportunities.
An additional aspect that models must take into account is that even within
a specific choice of context for the social network, a static picture may often be
inaccurate. In fact, some interactions between nodes could eliminate links depend-
ing on the outcome of that interaction. Analogously, individuals may change the
strategy underlying their behavior as a function of the development of the interac-
tions. Further complications arise from the fact that all these dynamics can take
place at different time scales. On the first issue, some modeling has been done
in terms of co-evolving networks [25], but to study the social factors discussed
here requires a different approach that takes into account the mechanisms in some
detail. In particular, an issue that has not been very much studied is that of mod-
els with heterogeneous agents, both in terms of (possibly weighted) links and on
their own characteristics. As with the experiment, social features require distin-
guishable agents, and this is rarely taken into account in models of cooperation
[see Ref. 35]. This would be most interesting in connection with the question about
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hunter-gatherer groups prior to the Neolithic transition, where introducing social
considerations in a model such as that of Boyd et al. [6] may lead to new and deeper
insights.
As far as the learning or strategy dynamics are concerned, given what is known
about the near-universal influence of reinforcement learning in nearly every species
studied (actions that result in benefits are repeated, those that result in loss are
not), inclusion of a reinforcement learning mechanism [34] that determines not only
whether actions will be repeated but also with which nodes may bring simulations
closer to representing cooperative behavior as it is expressed in the natural world.
Current knowledge about learning in humans and other animals indicates that
learning should occur over a strategy set, not simply over immediately preceding
actions.
A word is in order here regarding the availability of data on social networks.
Nowadays, very large scale studies are being carried out by resorting to the use
of the so-called “big data”, such as communication among users of mobile phones,
relationship maps built from twitter feeds, and so on. While such large-scale stud-
ies are certainly interesting and provide very valuable information about human
behavior, for the purpose we are considering here more detailed data (on possibly
smaller sets) might be needed in order to properly account for the factors relevant
in a social context. This immediately raises questions of privacy and other ethically
important points, which may require quite some preliminary work on how these
data should be made available and handled. In fact, it may be useful to resort to
more sociological studies, carried out in small communities with much detail about
their social context, such as [23, 49]. In this context, it is important to note that all
these issues relate to data obtained in an “observational” manner, i.e. by monitor-
ing the activity of people who are unaware of being followed. This is a very useful
procedure which would be tantamount to observing primate groups in their own
natural environment. However, it is often the case that this type of data does not
allow one to address specific questions of interest, nor does it provide good statis-
tics of particular points that do not occur often in a natural context. Therefore,
it will be necessary to complement those “observational” data by “interventional”
results, in which the natural environment is modified to focus on the point or points
that the researchers want to elucidate. This will probably require the development
of some kind of large-scale experimental facility suitable to handle groups with
numerous individuals, which is a very difficult task indeed (see Ref. 29 for a related
discussion).
A final remark concerns the way models themselves are built. Increased com-
munication between those who model the social behavior of humans and those who
observe the social behavior of other animals should generate beneficial ideas on both
sides; in addition to suggesting factors for modelers to consider in their attempts
to understand and predict cooperative behavior of agents, those who study the
behavior of animals will be introduced to quantitative tools that can aide in testing
hypotheses. At this time the proposed influence of these social factors remains open
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to testing and we are far from predicting how these social dimensions interact with
one another to promote or inhibit cooperative expression. This quest would benefit
from modeling techniques that could make predictions that could be tested against
observations in the natural world.
6. Conclusion
Although the topic of cooperation has fascinated biologists and psychologists for
decades, the proximate, social factors that influence the expression and stabil-
ity of cooperation in the animal kingdom have remained largely uninvestigated.
It is argued here that certain features of the social world, including the size of
the social group to which an individual belongs, the social tolerance expressed
in that group, the structure of the dominance hierarchy, and the patterns of dis-
persal, will influence the probability of cooperative expression and the stability
of cooperative behavior. In addition, the social environment experienced by a
species over evolutionary time will have shaped their cognition to provide certain
strengths and strategies that are beneficial in their species’ social world. These cog-
nitive adaptations will also impact the likelihood of cooperating in a given social
environment.
One productive route toward an understanding of whether these social dimen-
sions influence the expression of cooperative behavior across primates specifically,
and animals more generally, may be through a quantitative modeling approach.
The specific case of human cooperative behavior is of the utmost importance and
in that respect the proposals we have made in the previous section guide the way
to human experiments to test the ideas we have presented. Hints as to how this
quest would benefit from modeling techniques that could make predictions that
could be tested against observations in the natural world have also been provided.
Work along these directions would be an invaluable contribution to understanding
the social roots of human cooperation.
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